

**GOVT 332: Terrorism and Insurgency**  
**Department of Government & International Affairs**  
**Sweet Briar College**

Spring 2009  
Wednesday, 230:4:20  
Room: Gray 206

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Office Hours: Wed. 12-2:00  
Location: Gray Hall 211

*Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.*

Mao Zedong

This course explores the phenomena of terrorism and insurgency. Conceptual and historical examinations of the subject will be followed by a consideration of the various sources of terrorism and insurgency including the psychological, social, religious, organizational, and strategic influences that generate transnational political violence. Students will examine contending arguments pertaining to effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies

The initial analytical point of departure of this course is that terrorism and insurgency are generally indistinguishable forms of warfare. This is particularly the case today as localized insurgencies witness the participation by terrorist organizations with global reach, and as many terrorist organizations and localized insurgencies share strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and missions. The primary focus of this class will be to explore this major hypothesis in detail by examining the relationships between insurgency-counterinsurgency (COIN) and terrorism-counterterrorism as portrayed in the extant academic literature. One of the unique (idiosyncratic?) aspects of this course is the dedication spent to the exploration of how the organizational cultures of professional militaries facilitate or hamper COIN “best-practices” and national security objectives.

**Required Texts:**

- Robert Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008)
- Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006)
- Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, revised (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005)
- John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002)
- Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007)
- Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)

Additional readings are assigned and are marked by an asterisk (\*). These readings are available on the GOVT 332 Moodle page.

### **Course Requirements:**

Your performance will be assessed according to three criteria:

1. Attendance and participation are required and expected (20% of the final grade)
2. An analytical review and assessment of Jeffrey Record's *Beating Goliath*, due **March 11**. (30% of the final grade)
3. A term paper, due **Thursday, May 7**. (50% of the final grade). This research project will provide an in-depth examination of an insurgency (selected after consultation with the professor), the strategies that relevant governments adopted to combat it, and the success or failure of the counterinsurgency strategies. On **March 11**, a research outline is due that specifies the topic, preliminary structure of the paper, and proposed research strategy. Possible topics include (but are not limited to): the American Revolutionary War, Confederate Guerrillas, the Philippine Wars, Nicaragua, Greece, El Salvador, and Chechnya. More specific instruction will follow.

**My policy for late papers is firm: papers are discounted two letter grades if not submitted at the beginning of class, followed by one letter grade for each subsequent 24 hour period.**

### **Grading criteria:**

“A” denotes excellent command of readings and lectures, incisive analytical faculty, as well as mature and independent judgment.

“B” denotes good command of readings and lectures, good analytical faculty and good judgment. (Note that a “B” is a good grade for the instructor.)

“C” denotes significant deficiencies in at least one of the criteria (i.e., readings, lectures, analysis and judgment).

“D” and “F” denote significant deficiencies in more than one of these criteria.

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### **1/21: The Evolution of Warfare: A Generational Perspective (roughly 100 pp.)**

T. X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 1-75, 207-23

\*T. E. Lawrence, “Science of Guerrilla Warfare,” Vol. 10, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14<sup>th</sup> ed. (1929)

\*Mao Tse-tung, “Mao’s Primer on Guerrilla War,” Samuel B. Griffith, trans. *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January 1962), 43-45.

### **1/28: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare I (109 pp.)**

Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 1-70

Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror*, 1-20.

\*FM 23-4, *Counterinsurgency*, Department of the Army, 1-19.

**2/4: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare II (81 pp.)**

O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 71-152

**2/11: Counterinsurgency I—Strategy, Operations, and Tactics (101 pp.)**

O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 155-197

\*FM 23-4, 19-29

\*Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7-16.

\*Daniel L. Byman, "Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism," *International Security*, 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006), 79-115.

\*Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Petraeus Doctrine," *The Atlantic Monthly* (October 2008) 4p.

**2/18: Counterinsurgency II— Organizational Culture and COIN, Britain and Russia (113 pp.)**

Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror*, 37-98

Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 59-111

**Note: No class scheduled—professor will be attending the annual conference of the International Studies Association.**

**Please read the assigned chapters with an eye to understanding of how the authors conceptualize the military organizational cultures of the states under consideration, and how those cultures influenced the counterinsurgency strategies, operations and tactics employed in the various campaigns.**

**2/25: Counterinsurgency III— Organizational Culture and COIN (105 pp.)**

\*Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 17-29

Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror*, 21-35

John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 3-51

\*Krepinevich, 4-7, 27-55.

**3/4: Counterinsurgency IV: Organizational Culture and COIN in Vietnam (128 pp)**

Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror*, 99-126

Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 115-87

\*Austin Long, "Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence—The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006," *RAND Counterinsurgency Study*, Paper 6, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2008)

Available at: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\\_papers/OP200/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP200/).

**3/11: Does Insurgency Pay? The Case of the Iraq War (139 pp.)**

Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books 2007).

**Book Review Due**

**Term Paper Outline Due**

### **3/18: No class—spring break**

#### **3/25: Dispatches from the “Frontline”—The Case of the Iraq War Reconsidered (XXX pp.)**

- \*Bensahel, Nora et al., . *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2008), summary, chs. 2, 3, 13.  
Available at: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG642.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG642.pdf)
- \*Daniel Byman, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?,” *Security Studies* 17, no. 4 (2008): 599-643.
- \*Andrew F. Krepinevich, “How to Win In Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2005), 8p.
- \*Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2006), 5p.
- \*Brian Burton and John Nagl, “Learning as we go: the US army adapts to counterinsurgency in Iraq, July 2004-December 2006,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 303-327.
- \*Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, "How to Leave a Stable Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2008) 8p.

#### **4/1: Dispatches from the “Frontline” II—The Case of the Afghanistan War (91 pp.)**

- \*Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today* (New York: Gotham Books, 2006), 352-384
- \*Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,” *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), pp. 7-40.
- \*Sean M. Maloney, “A violent impediment: the evolution of insurgent operations in Kandahar province 2003-07,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2008), 201-220.
- \*Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, " From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2008), 7p.

#### **4/8: From Insurgency to Terrorism: Global Insurgency (108 pp)**

- \*Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* (Winter 2002-03), 30-58.
- \*David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, *War by Other Means*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 23-73.  
Available at: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf)
- \*David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005), 597-617.
- \*George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy: The Anthropology of Insurgency,” *The New Yorker*, (18 December 2006), 60-69.

#### **4/15: International Terrorism—Transnational Linkages (134 pp.)**

Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, chs 1, 2, 4, and 5

**4/22: Strategies of Terrorism (119 pp.)**

- \*Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security*, 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), 49-80.
- \*Justin V. Hastings, "Geography, Globalization, and Terrorism: The Plots of *Jemmah Islamiyah*," *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 2008), 505-530.
- \*Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), 78-105.
- \*Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security*, 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006), 42-78.

**4/29: Tactics of Terrorism (125 pp.)**

- \*Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 131-256

**5/7: Term paper due**