

GOVT 345: International Conflict Resolution
Department of Government & International Affairs
Sweet Briar College

Spring 2008
MWF 11:30-12:20
Location: Gray 206

Spencer D. Bakich
sbakich@sbc.edu
Office Hours: Mon. 1:00-3:00
Location: Gray Hall 211

It is a truism, and thus analytically useless, to note that all wars end. Of critical importance in light of the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are the *processes* and *conditions* under which wars terminate. In this course, we shall investigate the causes of conflict resolution. By “conflict resolution,” we mean both the cessation of hot and cold wars. One of the central questions that will be addressed is, “Why are some conflicts long and protracted, while others are short in duration?” This course is designed to introduce students to a number of important theories of conflict resolution as well as to provide an in-depth historical exploration of how key conflicts have ended. Theoretically, we will examine spiral and deterrence models, costly signaling models, information-based security regime approaches, international structural and domestic regime arguments, and information structural explanations of the expansion and contraction of war. Historically, we will examine the end of the Cold War, the First World War, the Persian Gulf and Iraq wars, as well as a number of civil wars.

The following books can be purchased either at the SBC book shop or on-line:

- Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), revised edition.
- Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
- Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
- Dan Lindley, *Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
- H. E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination & the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Additional readings, marked with an (*) can be obtained on the course Moodle page.

Requirements:

1. Participation (20% of final grade). Assessed by two criteria:

a. Attendance and active participation. This necessitates a careful and close reading of the arguments offered in each work. **It is imperative that you stay on top of the material covered in class. If, for any reason, you find yourself in a position where you cannot attend class, please contact me immediately.**

b. Theory Journals: All students are required to keep a record of the readings in blue exam books (I suggest purchasing the largest type available). These will consist of a

schematic diagram of the basic argument for the readings of the day that includes the causal factor(s) (independent variable), the result (dependent variable) and any intervening variables (factors that mediate the effect of the independent on the dependent variable). In short, you will diagram what the author is trying to explain and how she/he actually explains it. For example, a simple “arrow diagram” for an argument can look like this: $A \rightarrow B$. This is read as, “A causes B.” In this case, A is the “independent variable” and B is the “dependent variable.” Remember, A and B are both *variables*. This means that the absence of A will lead to the absence of B. A more complex causal chain is as follows:

$$\begin{array}{c} B \rightarrow C \rightarrow E \\ + \\ D \rightarrow F \end{array}$$

You can read this causal chain as: B causes C, C without D causes E, C with D causes F. In this case, C and D are “intervening variables”—they intervene in the causal process that begins with B, or the independent variable. Your entry will also include a brief description of the argument (i.e., you should translate your diagrams into standard English), and a statement as to whether you think the evidence provided supports the causal argument made.

Journals will be spot checked on a random basis and graded. Your grade will reflect whether you are keeping the journal up to date rather than whether your particular interpretation is accurate. Nonetheless, I expect that you will make corrections to your diagrams and descriptions based on class discussions. Make sure to check for special instructions at the end of each day’s list of readings. These instructions will include the readings that should be diagrammed.

2. Complete a take-home mid-term and final book review essay. The mid-term essay will be due at the end of the class period on Friday, March 7. The book review will be due Sunday, May 4 by 5:00 p.m. These essays should be submitted electronically in .doc format. **My policy for late papers is firm: papers are discounted two letter grades if not submitted on time, followed by one letter grade for each subsequent 24 hour period. No extensions will be granted.** The mid-term essay is worth 30% and the final essay is worth 50% of the final grade. The papers should be no more than 10 and 15 pages in length, respectively.

Grading criteria:

“A” denotes excellent command of readings and lectures, incisive analytical faculty, as well as mature and independent judgment.

“B” denotes good command of readings and lectures, good analytical faculty and good judgment. (Note that a “B” is a good grade for the instructor.)

“C” denotes significant deficiencies in at least one of the criteria (i.e., readings, lectures, analysis and judgment).

“D” and “F” denote significant deficiencies in more than one of these criteria.

A few words on plagiarism:

Plagiarism is the use of material that is not your own without proper citation and quotation. Plagiarism of any sort—intentional or unintentional—is a serious academic offense. Any student who plagiarizes in this course will receive an automatic F and no credit for having taken it. There is a strong possibility that the student will be expelled from the college for committing such an offense. *It is far easier to do honest work than to suffer the consequence of cheating.*

1/16—Introduction: no assigned readings

A Primer on Conflict Termination

1/18—58 pages

Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 1-58.

1/21—47 pages

Iklé, 59-105

Diagram Iklé’s argument(s): Note there will be multiple IVs.

System Effects and Undesired Outcomes in War

1/23—59 pages

*Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 29-87.

1/25—43 pages

*Jervis, *System Effects*, 253-95

What are the main themes and arguments presented by Jervis?

Security Dilemma, Spiral Model, and GRIT

1/28—48 pages

*Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), 186-214 (NOTE: not whole piece).

*Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival* Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993), 27-47.

Diagram Posen

1/30—56 pages

*Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58-113 (Chapter 3, “Deterrence and the Spiral Model”)

Diagram the deterrence and spiral models

2/1—69 pages

*Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 18-36, 85-134.

Diagram Osgood

How Did the Cold War End?

2/4—65 pages

*Richard A. Bitzinger, "Gorbachev and GRIT, 1985-1989: Did Arms Control Succeed because of Unilateral Actions of in spite of Them?" *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 15, No. 1 (April 1994) pp. 68-79.

*Alan R. Collins, "GRIT, Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War," *Review of International Studies* Vol. 24, No. 2 (April 1998) pp. 201-219.

*Richard Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hardliners Were Right" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (January/February 1995) pp. 154-60.

*Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Did 'Peace Through Strength' End the Cold War? Lessons from INF," *International Security* Vol. 16, No. 1, (Summer 1991) pp. 162-188.

Briefly identify the main points of the authors above, noting with whom they disagree and how.

2/6—48 pages

*Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 5-53.

Diagram Brooks and Wohlforth

2/8—34 pages

*Mark L. Haas, "The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics?" *International Organization*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Winter 2007), 145-179.

Diagram Haas

Could the Cold War Have Ended Sooner?

2/11—88 pages

Melvyn P. Leffler, *For The Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 3-9, 151-233.

What are the variables/influences Leffler will be exploring in this book? Highlight their impact in the Cuba case. Why did the Cold War not end at this time?

2/13—103 pages

Leffler, 234-337

Why did the Cold War not end at this time? Why did Détente fail?

2/15—112 pages

Leffler, 338-450

How and why did the Cold War end with Reagan and Gorbachev?

Settling Civil Wars—the Case for Credible Commitments

2/18—42 pages

Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 3-44.

Diagram Walter's argument

2/20—102 pages

Walter, 47-108

What do the quantitative findings tell us?

2/22—55 pages

Walter, 113-68

What are the processes of success in Zimbabwe and failure in Rwanda?

Peacekeeping: the Case for Regime Sponsored Transparency

2/25—54 pages

Dan Lindley, *Promoting Peace With Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 1-54.

Diagram the argument

2/27—31 pages

Lindley, 55-85

How did information preserve stability in the international system during the time of the Concert of Europe?

2/29—TBD

Lindley, assigned chapters, plus 180-95

Small-group presentations

Exams handed out

The Partition Debate

3/3—126 pages

*Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), 136-175.

*Alexander B. Downes, "The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars," *Security Studies* Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), 230-279.

*David Laitin, "Ethnic Unmixing and Civil War," *Security Studies* Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), 350-365.

*James D. Fearon, "Separatist Wars, Partition and World Order," *Security Studies* Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), 394-415.

3/5—Student meetings, upon request

3/7—*Exams due by end of class—hard copy submission*

3/10-3/14 Spring Break—Enjoy!

War Aims and War Termination: the Case of World War 1

3/17—50 pages

H. E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination & the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-52.

Diagram Goemans

3/19—TBD

Goemans, 53-72, plus one case study to be assigned.

Small-group presentations

3/21—78 pages

Goemans, 232-309.

Why did WWI end in 1918, but not in 1917?

Avoiding Strategic Blow-Back: Institutional and Information-Based Conditions

3/24—49 pages

*Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (December 1997), 1-49.

Diagram Labs

3/26—63 pages

*Richard Smoke, *War: Controlling Escalation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 3-35, 268-97.

Diagram Smoke

3/28— 77 pages

*Martin Van Creveld, *Command In War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 261-75.

*Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd edition, (Washington: D. C.: 2006), 119-80.

Can the “directed telescope” function effectively in modern bureaucracies?

3/31— 38 pages

*Spencer D. Bakich, “Strategy in the Shadow of Threat: Information Processing, Decision Making, and Intervention in Limited Warfare,” ms 2007.

Diagram Bakich

The Case of the Gulf War: The American Information Structure

4/2—60 pages

The NSC

*David Rothkopf: *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 260-302.

*George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), 29-42, 314-333.

How should we conceptualize Bush I’s NSC?

4/4—68 pages

The CIA and the Military

*Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 503-36.

*Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 297-330.

What was the nature of the relationship between the White House and the intelligence community and military?

The Case of the Gulf War: Planning and Waging Coalition Warfare

What supporting or disconfirming evidence can we find for the information structure hypothesis?

4/7—110 pages

*Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 1-110.

4/9—91 pages

*Freedman and Karsh, 143-79, 201-210, 228-274.

4/11—110 pages

*Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 1995), 123-158, 194-196.

*Freedman and Karsh, 331-361, 374-385, 410-442.

The Case of the Iraq War: The American Information Structure

4/14—83 pages

The NSC and CMR

*Rothkopf, 389-441

*Herspring, 377-408.

How should we characterize Bush II's NSC?

What was the relationship between the White House and the military?

4/16—54 pages

Intelligence

*Paul Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April 2006).

*George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: FSG, 2005), 100-148.

What was the relationship between the White House and the intelligence community?

4/18—99 pages

Interagency Coordination

*James Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 293, No.1 (January-February 2004), 19 pages.

*_____, "Bush's Lost Year," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol., 294, No. 3 (October 2004), 13 pages.

*Donald Drechsler, "Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 28, No. 1 (February 2005), 3-30

*Andrew Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5 (2005), 1013-1038.

*Nora Bensahel, "Mission Not Accomplished," in *War In Iraq: Planning and Execution*, eds. Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney (New York: Routledge, 2007), 129-144. *Where were the major breakdowns in information sharing in the U.S. government, and what effects did they have?*

The Case of the Iraq War: Origins, Blunders, and Insurgency
What supporting or disconfirming evidence can we find for the information structure hypothesis?

4/21—57 pages

*Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 58-115.

4/23—41 pages

*Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 38-54, 138-163.

4/25—116 pages

*Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong and Right in Iraq," in Francis Fukuyama, ed. *Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) 173-95

*Toby Dodge, "The Causes of US Failure in Iraq," *Survival* Vol. 49, No. 1 (Spring 2007), 85-106.

*Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 271-344.

4/28—***Book Review assigned***